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1. Introduction 
The last decades have witness a structural shift from the exports of traditional agricultural food 
products such as cocoa and sugar by most developing countries to non-traditional high value 
agricultural food products such processed and fresh fruits and vegetables (Reardon et al, 2009). 
Thus, trade is increasingly playing a significant role in the provision of food, export earnings 
and economic growth for many developing countries. However, this cannot be categorically 
said for Africa countries, many of who have gradually become predominant net food importers 
(World Bank, 2012). In addition, the continent continues to depend majorly on exports of 
traditional valued agricultural-food products despite the structural shift of most developing 
countries to non-traditional high value agricultural. Consequently, this may jeopardise the 
significant role played by food export in stimulating economic growth and as a means of 
poverty reduction especially for sub-Saharan African countries many of which depend heavily 
on agriculture for sustenance. This weak integration of most African countries into global 
economy can be an impediment to the developmental progress of the continent, majorly 
because deep trade integration is widely viewed as the most promising avenue to achieving 
economic growth (Nicita and Rollo, 2015). 
Numerous factors have been linked to the weak integration of African countries in global 
markets and these include high cost of exporting and poorly developed trade facilitation 
infrastructure (Djankov, Freund, and Pham, 2010; and Iwanow and Kirkpatrick, 2009 and 
Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2012), domestic supply constraints (Xiong and Beghin, 2012) and 
trade inhibiting non-tariff barriers imposed on its exports (Shephard and Wilson, 2013, Otsuki 
et al., 2001). Of these obstacles, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) have been identified as the single 
most important market access condition for Africa’s exports (Czubala et al, 2009), thus 
necessitating a careful study of it. Consequently, a better understanding of the actual 
impacts/implications of such NTBs for market access is of paramount importance for the 
continent majority of who depend on agricultural activities for livelihood.  
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The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of two important non-tariff regulations 
imposed by the EU on Africa’s food exports. The first is food safety standard which has gained 
in importance in recent years due to a number of food scares in developed countries 
(UnNeverhr, 2003). This makes standards to constitute one of the most important market access 
conditions imposed by the EU on food exports. Standard is of particular concern to exporters 
due to its dual ability to be used as protectionist measure in preventing imports and its 
legitimate use for the protection of consumers’ health and safety. On the one hand, there is the 
‘standards as barrier’ perspective where standard has been viewed as a barrier to export 
penetration due to its trade costs effects. The proposition is that standards affect trade 
competitiveness because meeting stringent standards imposes excessive costs of compliance 
borne by the producers which might erode export competitiveness and affect the profitability of 
the export product, thereby acting as a barrier to trade (Markus and Wilson, 2001). In addition, 
the increasing stringency of these standards implies rising cost of compliance. Higher 
compliance costs for developing countries discourages potential exporters from penetrating 
foreign markets, drive less productive firms away from international market, decreases both the 
trade volume and sustainability of the remaining exporters (Bao and Chen, 2013).  The 
situation is aggravated for exporters from Africa due to their lack of necessary infrastructure 
and technology which inhibit their ability to comply with importing countries standards. 
However, standards can also be trade enhancing once the right set of environment is set up 
(Jaffee and Henson, 2004). On the one hand, the view of standards as a catalyst to trade 
argument is in line with the demand enhancing effects of standards. According to this stance, 
standards help in building value into certified goods and services as it provide consumers with 
information and assurance about their health and safety, therefore stimulating import demand 
(Moenius, 2004). Standards also remedy asymmetric information, providing information to 
producers about the specifications and technicalities of the products, which can lead to 
technology diffusion and innovation (Baller, 2007).  
 
A second but usually neglected market access condition that exporters face when exporting 
fresh fruits and vegetable to the EU is the EU entry price control. This measure aims to protect 
EU growers of 15 fruits and vegetable products from international competition by the 
imposition of a minimum entry price requirement. This non-tariff measure acts to restrict the 
synthetic import prices below the predetermined entry price, and lead to the imposition of a 
specific duty on exports, when the import price falls below a predetermined minimum entry 
price. This therefore erodes the export competitiveness while increasing EU growers’ 
competitiveness relative to exporters’. This system of protection is known as the EU entry price 
system (thereafter EPS) and it is imposed simultaneously with the EU safety standards. 
 
This study therefore investigates the implications of EU entry price conditions and safety 
standards on Africa’s exports, on the probability of initiating new export relationship with the 
EU (the extensive margin1 of trade). We investigated the impact within a gravity model using 
panel dataset between 2008 and 2013 focusing on the fresh fruits and vegetables exports – 
namely tomatoes, oranges, lime and lemons. The choice of the export products is due to the fact 
that they are simultaneously subjected to EU entry price control and also attract stringent 
pesticides regulations due to their perishability nature and susceptibility to food safety risks. In 
                                                          
1 Export expansion at the extensive margin implies, selling new products to new markets, selling new products to existing markets, selling 
exiting products to new markets. However, in this paper, the concept of extensive margin is used in the context of selling existing products to 
new markets.  
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our analysis, we investigated the potential impacts of food safety standards on Africa’s export, 
using EU food safety regulations on allowable pesticide residues in food.  Although EU food 
safety standard regulations encompass many requirements, all of which needed to be satisfied, 
however, the focus of this study is on pesticide standards. Out of all EU food safety 
requirements, the violation of the acceptable maximum residual limits (MRL) of pesticides in 
food or feed products represents the second largest reason for border rejections of third 
country’s exports to the EU, which consequently constitutes loss of export revenue and 
products to the exporters. In fact, the violations of pesticide residue limits constitute about 70% 
of EU rejection of all Africa’s fruits and vegetable exports between 2008 and 2013, thus 
indicating an important market access problem (EC RASFF, 2014). 
 
 
This study is motivated by the recent literature on firm heterogeneity which reveal that the 
growth of developing countries trade was predominantly due to the expansion of trade along 
the extensive margin rather than due to growth in the volume of trade (Reis and Farole, 2012;  
Nicita and Roll, 2015). In spite of this assertion, we argue that the ability of African countries 
to initiate or penetrate new markets might be ultimately constrained by stringent importing 
countries market conditions. Thus, the analysis of aforementioned EU market conditions in the 
food sector on Africa’s along the extensive margin is crucial to understand the process of entry 
and exist in export markets and also identify which factor may be the biggest constraint to 
Africa’s export competiveness. For instance, studies that look at the impact of EU market 
conditions in the food sector on Africa’s exports has predominantly focus on the intensive 
margin (Otsuki, et al., 2001; Grebrehewit et al., 2007). However, the implications of EU food 
regulations have received less attention on market access at the extensive margin of trade. 
Having a better understanding of the effects of these two EU market access conditions in the 
food sector and its effects on potential exporters is therefore important from a policy 
perspective. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the two EU market access conditions. Section 3 assesses the extent to which the 
two market access conditions affect Africa export’s competitiveness. Section 4 discusses the 
methodology and the data. Section 5 discusses the results and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Market Access Requirements in EU Food Sector 
This section provides background information on the two important and complementary non-
tariff measures on fruits and vegetable in the EU – pesticides standards and the EU entry price 
system. In this study, we focus on 3 selected products at a HS6 disaggregated level, namely 
tomatoes, oranges, and lime and lemon. The choice of these fresh and vegetable products is due 
to the fact that they have the potential to retain high levels of different pesticide. In addition, 
they represent important products subjected to the EU entry price control. 
 
2.1 Pesticide Standards Regulations in the EU 
Pesticides are active substance used in protecting crops from pests and diseases before and after 
harvest. While their major aim is to increase the quantity and quality of the produce, however, 
mis/use can poses significant risks to human health and the environment. This necessitates 
countries to place stringent safety standards on pesticide use and residue levels. Thus, stringent 
risk assessments are usually undertaken to determine the maximum acceptable daily intake of 
pesticide over a person’s lifetime that would pose no adverse consequent.  
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In the EU, pesticides regulation is governed by European Commission (EC) Directive 
396/20052, which establishes the MRLs of pesticides allowed in products of plants and animal 
origin intended for consumption, based on scientific evidence from risk assessments. This 
directive which became operational starting from September, 2008 harmonized all pesticides 
standards among EU Member countries With this directive, EU pesticides regulation became 
more encompassing as more than thrice the previous number of pesticides were regulated. 
Figure 1 displays the number of pesticides regulated for each of the 3 products considered in 
this study. The EU regulates a large number of pesticides standards on tomatoes, oranges, and 
lime and lemon, amounting to 468 standards in 2008 which declined to about 462 in 2013. This 
recent reduction in the number regulated is due to some previously regulated pesticides 
standards being exempted from regulation, because subsequent scientific risk assessment 
proves them to be safe for consumption.  
 
 
                                                   <Figure 1 about here> 
 
While number tells us the extent of the standard, it does not however provide information about 
the intensity or stringency of the standard. This is provided by the maximum residue limit 
imposed on the pesticides. MRL is the unit of measure of pesticide standards and its stringency 
level. Thus such pesticide standards are regulated using the maximum residue levels of the 
pesticide substance found in or on food, based on good agricultural practices (GAP). The 
stringency level of pesticide standards is measured in part per million (given in mg/kg). Figure 
2 displays the average stringency level of the subsets of harmonised pesticides regulated by the 
EU between 2008 and 2013.  
 
 
                                                   <Figure 2 about here> 
 
 
The stringency of the pesticides standards in the EU differ significantly among the 3 products 
considered (Figure 2). From a high stringency level in 2008, pesticide standards on these 3 
products became more restrictive in 2009 (a decrease in the maximum allowed is observed in 
Figure 2, which signifies higher stringency and thus, a more restrictive standard). Furthermore, 
the stringency level of  oranges, and lime and lemon are more restrictive in 2011 compared to 
2010, while that of tomato is more restrictive in 2013 compare to what was obtained in 2012. 
Thus, the net effect of this restrictiveness is an empirical one. 
  
2.2. EU Entry Price System for Fruits and Vegetables 
The second aspect of food regulation market germane to countries importing certain fresh fruits 
to the EU is a non-tariff measure in the form of ‘behind the border’ price requirement known as 
                                                          
2 Prior to this, pesticide regulation used to be fragmented among the EU countries. However, its introduction repealed the four previously 
existing fragmented or unharmonised regulations (directives 76/895/EEC, 86/362/EEC, 86/363/EEC and 90/642/EEC) on pesticides. The 
directive has been consequently amended several times as new scientific evidence on previously non-established substances were discovered 
and old ones are amended or repealed.  
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the EU entry price control. This system of regulation protects EU growers of 15 fruits and 
vegetable products including tomato, oranges and lime, from international competition by 
regulating the entry prices of these products from exporting countries. This is done by 
penalizing third countries exports whose prices fall below a predetermined seasonally varying 
stipulated minimum entry price, through the imposition of specific duties on these exports 
(Goetz and Grethe, 2010). This system of protection is known as the EU entry price system 
(thereafter EPS). The EPS is a non-tariff measure which aims to restrict import prices below the 
stipulated entry price and act to erode the competitiveness of exporters and increase the 
competitiveness of EU growers relative to exporters’. For instance, if the exporter supplies the 
product at a price below the maximum stipulated entry price as a result of having a competitive 
edge due to lower costs of production, then a predetermined specific duty is levied as a penalty 
factor. The EU EPS come into force in July 1, 1995, replacing the old reference price system. 
 
To calculate the entry price duties, information is needed on the import price of the product and 
the predetermined entry price. However, in the EU a large proportion of EU fruits and 
vegetable imports are paid on commission, implying that the import price of the product is not 
determined until it is sold in the EU markets (Goetz and Grethe, 2010). The European 
Commission (EC) therefore calculates a ‘synthetic’ import price which the Commission refers 
to as the standard import values (SIVs). The applicable SIVs, published on a daily basis by the 
EC are calculated from a survey of fruits and vegetable prices for each product and export 
origin, collated from designated representative fruits and vegetables wholesales markets in all 
the EU member countries (Goetz and Grethe, 2008).  For each country and product, a SIV3 is 
then calculated on a daily basis as a weighted average of all the wholesale market prices 
collated from all these representative markets, less the marketing costs, transportation costs and 
custom duties (EC Regulation 3223/94).  
The EU schedule of entry price (EP) varies by season with lower entry prices imposed during 
EU off season period of the applicable fruits and vegetables, and high entry prices are imposed 
when the fruits and vegetables are in seasons in the EU (Ciofﬁ and dell' Aquila, 2004). 
Although almost all African countries enjoy preferential access to the EU market under the 
‘Every Thing but Arms Agreement”, in terms of zero tariff on their exports, however, this 
benefit does not extend largely to EP as only Morocco enjoy preferential EP duties while the 
others have to comply with EU’s most favoured nation (MFN) market access conditions of the 
EPS.  
                                                          
3 EU allows exporters 3 options in determining the applicable EPS duties applicable: standard import values, using the FOB prices and the 
deductive price. An option is declaring export value using FOB price which is then then adjusted for insurance and freight costs, giving rise to 
the CIF price. The deductive price option is based on the final selling price of the consignment as indicated by an invoice. Thus, when the SIV 
is far above the floor EP, this result in the very high duties, and importer may resort to using these two methods, however, the duties still 
applies. 
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Table 1 shows the schedule of minimum entry prices for the 3 products considered in this 
study. For tomatoes and lemon, the entry price runs throughout the whole year from the first of 
January of the year to the thirty-first of December, as EU growers are not that competitive in 
producing this product. However, the entry price system runs between December and May for 
oranges, which correspond to the after harvest period of EU growers – a period in which 
oranges are out of season and EU domestic prices are less competitive. This is in sharp contrast 
to Africa countries most of who have relative price competitiveness all year round due to the 
favourable tropical region and cheaper labour. In the case of tomatoes, the EP varies between 
52.60 €/100 kg and 112.60 €/100kg); for oranges, the maximum EP is 35.40 €/100kg and the 
minimum is 32.60 €/100kg; but varies between 46.20 €/100 kg and 55.80 €/100kg in the case 
of lemon. Exporters whose export price falls below the maximum entry price are penalised for 
bringing in products relatively cheaper than the domestic ones through the imposition of EP 
duties. For tomatoes, the duty ranges from a minimum of 0 €/100kg to maximum of 29.8 
€/100kg, the range for oranges are between 0 €/100kg and 7.10 /€/100kg, and between 0 
€/100kg and 25. 6 €/100kg for lemons. 
                                            <Table 1>   
  
The applicable EP duties are determined as follows: if the synthetic import price (in this case 
SIV) is equal or greater than the maximum EP in any given season, no EP duty is levied. In 
other words, export products whose price is equal or greater than the maximum entry price 
always attract zero EP duties. However, if the ‘synthetic import price’ is below the maximum 
EP, but above the minimum EP, an ad valorem tariff plus a specific EP duty is levied on the 
product. If the synthetic import price is equal or below the minimum EP in any given season, 
the highest EP duty applies which in our case is 29.80 €/100kg for tomatoes, 7.10 €/100kg  and 
25.60 €/100kg  for oranges and lemon respectively. Thus, the EPS penalises exporters that 
bring into the EU competitive exports by making cheaper exports to become more expensive. 
To get a clear idea of the EPS, we take an example from the EC TARRIC website. Table 2 
depicts the schedule of MFN EP levied on an African country that has a preferential agreement 
with the EU. On 1st of April, 2013, the synthetic import price of tomatoes from Morocco, 
Tunisia and all other African countries were 75.70 €/100kg, 97.00 €/100kg and 98.90 €/100kg 
respectively (EC, 2013). Using Table 2, this implies that all these African countries bring very 
competitive export to the EU, and these prices are well below the EU minimum entry price of 
103.60€/100kg (case 5). Thus, protecting EU growers from this price competition led to the 
imposition of a penalty factor on their exports in form of an additional maximum EP duty of 
29.80 €/100kg, amounting to a total import price of 105.50€/100kg for Morocco, 
126.80€/100kg for Tunisia and  128.7 €/100kg for all other African countries. The addition of 
this additional duty eroded the competitiveness of these exporters by making their cheap 
exports to become very expensive. Hypothetically, if an Africa country say Ghana was to arrive 
at the EU border at a CIF price of 112.6 €/100kg (case 1), no specific duty is levied on the 
product because the EU EPS requirement is perfectly satisfied.  In this case, the CIF price is 
equivalent to the prevailing maximum EP of 112.6 €/100kg. Thus, to avoid these EP duties, this 
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might alter the exporters’ pricing behaviour by making them to supply their product to the EU 
at the maximum possible price, so as to avoid the additional EP duties (Goetz and Grethe, 
2009).  
<Table 2> 
 
3. Africa’s Export Performance 
Africa has comparative advantage in the production of agricultural products, particularly 
tropical food products due to its favourable climatic conditions. Part of this huge production 
could result in exports, serving as export earnings thereby increasing economic growth. Thus, a 
competitive export performance is needed to realise this goal. Table 3 shows the direction of 
trade of the 3 products considered in this study between 1995 and 2013. We group these years 
into the period of pre-harmonisation of pesticide standards in the EU (1995 to 2007) where 
member states were not strictly obliged to adhere to EU standards, but are given the autonomy 
to impose their own country specific standards on export. The other period which falls between 
2008 and 2013 represent the harmonisation period when EU standards are fully harmonised 
among Members (Directive 396/2005).  
 
<Table 3 here> 
 
In terms of direction of trade, aside intra-Africa trade, the EU represents the most important 
trading partners of African countries. Therefore, trade policies implemented by the EU would 
have implications on their export performance and would also influence their decisions on 
whether or not to enter into trade relations with the EU. In the case of tomatoes, most of its 
export has been traded within Africa, amounting to as high as 86.5% between 1995 and 2013. 
74.4% of this constituted intra-Africa trade during the pre-harmonisation period, and this 
increased significantly to about 91.6% following the harmonisation of standards in the EU. 
This represents a sign of lack of significant market access to African countries. A further look 
at Table 3 signifies that EU remains the major destination of tomato export, aside Africa, 
absorbing about 9.4% of the continent tomato export between 1995 and 2007. This share 
however fell drastically to about 2.9% in the harmonisation period in the EU, not only due to 
the increased number of pesticides now regulated in this period but also due to the very 
stringent standards set by the EU to guide against risk from pesticide overdose.  The fall in 
African export of this product could be attributed to the high cost of upgrading their supply 
facilities in order to comply with the new set of EU standards which is aggravated by the 
continent’s lack of adequate financial and technological resources to successfully comply with 
such stringent standards (Otsuki et al, 2001).  
Apart from this, the EU entry price control on this product might be inhibiting their ability to 
access EU markets. In other words, EU price control which penalizes competitive exporters 
through the imposition of additional duties on African exporters who brings in competitive 
exports to the EU might also explains the declining exports to EU markets. In fact Chemnitz 
and Grethe (2005) found the EU entry price system to inhibit Morocco’s tomato exports to the 
8 
 
EU, and we proffer that similar effect might hold for these other African countries.  It is 
important to note that the precedent fall in Africa’s tomato exports to the EU in this period has 
led to trade diversion to other countries that have less stringent standards and no entry price 
control, particularly to Jordan and some other African countries that absorbed the excess supply 
of the product. 
However, the case of Africa’s export of orange is somewhat different. Intra Africa trade still 
constitute the main avenue where these exports are absorbed, which is about 80% in both pre 
and post harmonisation period. The high percentage of intra-Africa trade might indicate the 
lack of adequate market access to other markets. Remarkably, African export of oranges to the 
EU accelerated from about 13% in the pre-harmonisation period (1995 to 2007) to about 18.9 
in the post harmonisation period despite the prevalence of more stringent standards and 
increased in the number of regulated standards in this period. This might be indicative of the 
fact that these exporters were able to comply with the safety standards, which accelerated their 
increased penetration of EU markets. In addition, this improved market access to EU markets 
might also indicates that complying with EU entry price requirements does not constitute a 
huge barrier to export penetrations, at least for those who are exporting.  
Similar results was found for lime and lemon as the EU still remains the most important trading 
partner of this product, apart from intra trade within Africa which constitute about 68.1% and 
66.7% in the pre and post harmonisation period respectively. Africa’s direction of trade to the 
EU improved from 18.9% between 1995 and 2007 to 27.4% between 2008 and 2013 following 
the harmonisation of EU standards. In fact, African satisfied this increased export supply to the 
EU by diversifying a significant percentage of its export from Argentina in order to meet the 
increased import demand in the EU. This increment was realized in spite of the fact that the 
period coincide with period in which EU enacted more stringent food safety pesticide 
standards. The increased export penetration might also signal that the EU entry price control 
does not translate into a surmountable barrier for these African countries, although the exact 
impact remains an empirical one. 
Thus, the direction of trade indicates that the EU remains the largest most important 
international trading partner of African export for the 3 selected products and that African’s 
tomato exports witnessed significant decline during the EU period of standards harmonisation 
while her export of oranges, and lime and lemon accelerated in the same period.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
To investigate the trade impact of the two EU food regulations, we employ the gravity model 
which predicts that bilateral export between two countries is explained by economic masses 
between the trading countries and the geographical distance between them (Tinbergen, 1962; 
Pöyhönen 1963).  Gravity model has been widely used to estimate the effects of trade policies, 
migration; currency union, regional trade agreements (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Baier 
and Bergstrand, 2010). Its general acceptance as the workhorse of international trade and its 
proven popularity are primarily due to its exceptional success in predicting bilateral trade flows 
and the theoretical foundations given to it by trade theories.  
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4.1. Methodological Framework and Model Specification 
The theoretical model for our analysis is based on firm heterogeneity behavior which shows 
that due to the heterogeneous behaviour of firms, a small fraction of firms finds it profitable to 
export and while others choose not to as they are less productive. Thus, this makes the trade 
matrix to contain both positive and zero trade flows. The intuition is that EU market conditions 
on food might affect the probability of African countries exporting to the EU, with productive 
firms exporting and non-productive firms choosing not to export. 
 
Our empirical strategy is therefore to measure the effect of EU food regulations on Africa’s on 
the probability to export. Our model is similar to Nicita and Roll (2015) which analysed the 
impact of tariff on the extensive margin of trade for sub-Saharan exports. Similarly, we employ 
a probabilistic model to explore the implication of EU entry price system and food safety 
standards on the probability of exporting. More so, our bilateral exports data contain many 
zeros, thus allowing us to exploit the presence of zero trade flows along the extensive margin. 
More explicitly, the dataset on exports of tomatoes, oranges, and lime and lemon contains 
respectively about 86%, 79% and 82% zero trade observations between the trading countries.  
Although such zero flows can be attributed to statistical zeros such as rounding up, however, 
many of these zeros are likely to reflect Africa’s inability to trade as a result of the market 
access conditions set by the EU. Given this, our model is specified as:  
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Equation 1 is a probit model which determines the binary decision of whether to trade or not. 
The subscripts tji ,, and ln denote exporter, importer and time and logarithm respectively. The 
dependent variable ij  is the probability that country i  exports to country j , conditional on 
the observed variables; ijtT is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if country i exports to 
country j )1( ijtT  and zero when it does not )0( ijtT , where itY and jtY are respectively the 
exporting and importing countries nominal GDP measured in US dollars. ijtFR is the EU food 
regulations which spans entry price conditions and food safety standards. ijDist is the 
geographical distance between countries i and j. Lang, Col, and RTA are dummy variables 
which take the value of one when both the exporting and importing countries share a common 
language and have colonial ties, belong to the similar trade agreement, respectively, zero 
otherwise; and ijt is the idiosyncratic error term which is assumed to be well-behaved. These 
two measures of EU food regulations enter separately into equation (1) in order to disentangle 
their relative importance on Africa’s exports potential. The construction of these two measures 
is discussed in detailed in a later section. 
 
To obtain consistent estimates, we control for multilateral trade resistance terms using Baier 
and Bergstrand (2010) first order Taylor series approximation of bilateral trade costs using 
simple averages. Their approach also produces similar estimates similar to Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) structurally iterated least square method.   For each trade cost variable, the 
first order Taylor series is expanded and all the newly demeaned bilateral trade cost variables 
are transformed using the following approximation: 
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where x  stands for any of the variables associated with coefficients 3 to 7  in equation 1; ji PP  
is multilateral trade resistance terms 4 . The first term on the right hand side – 
jti
x  is the 
contribution of x  to ji PP , and N is the number of bilateral observations on exports. The second 
term on the right hand side is the simple average of gross trade costs facing exporter i  across 
all importer j . The third term on the right hand side denotes the simple average of all trade 
costs faced by importer j  across all exporters.  
 
 
4.2. Measuring EU Food Regulations  
This section provides information on how the two measures of EU food regulations on entry 
price and food safety standards were constructed. 
 
4.2.1. Measure of EU Entry Price System 
We constructed two distinct indicators at the bilateral level to capture the impact of EPS on 
Africa’s export. The first indicator that we constructed was the corresponding duties imposed 
by the EU due to the price control. The Second indicator measures the difference between the 
import price of the product and the corresponding EP. We used the SIVs as a measure for the 
EU import price of the commodity which is the imported price of the commodity less the 
marketing and transportation costs and custom duties.   
 
The first indicator is the calculation of the EP duties arising from the enforcement of the EPS 
by the EU on the 3 Africa’s exported products considered in this study.  For each product, the 
effectively applied daily EP duties measured in EUR per 100kg were manually computed. This 
sums up to about 365 data points in a year, resulting into a total of 2192 data points per 
product, between 2008 and 2013.  The daily ad valorem tariff an equivalent of these duties was 
thereafter calculated using the ‘WTO agricultural method’.  From this, a simple yearly average 
of the daily ad valorem tariff is calculated and used in our analysis. A priori, we expect that the 
EP tariff will have a negative impact on export flows.  
 
However, based on anecdotal evidence and producer pricing behaviour, the rational exporter 
may supply her export products at the maximum possible price to the EU when complying with 
the EP, so as to avoid the EP duties (Groetz and Grethe, 2009).  This is because no entry price 
duty is incurred on exports supplied at prices corresponding to, or slightly higher than the 
maximum EP. In this case all or most of the observations of our first indicator would be zero. 
Indeed, such pricing behaviour might make the exporter to supply the product at a price greater 
than what is obtainable in the domestic markets in the EU, which consequently erode the 
exporters’ competitive cost advantage. Thus, we introduce another variable to capture this 
                                                          
4According to Anderson and van Wincoop (2013), countries not only face bilateral trade costs when trading, they also face multilateral trade 
costs which is defined as all trade costs facing a given country from all trading partners. Omitting the multilateral trade costs will give bias 
gravity estimates and is popularly known as the ‘gold medal error’ (Baldwin and Tagloni, 2006) 
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pricing behaviour. The second indicator which we termed Gap captures the difference between 
the import price of the product (measures by the product’s SIV) and the corresponding 
maximum EP (which attracts always zero entry duty). This indicator is then given as:  
 
                              
m
itjitjijt EPSIVGap                                                                                      
(3) 
 
Where i, j, and t are respectively exporter, importer and time subscripts. SIV is the synthetic 
import price measured in dollar per 100/kg and EPm is the yearly maximum entry price 
measured in dollar per 100/kg.  This indicator is somewhat similar to that used by Goetz and 
Grethe (2009) with the exception that theirs is a relative indicator as the right hand side of 
equation (8) is divided by the EP, while ours is an absolute one. Using equation (3), 
observations on GAP can exhibit two distinct trends: it can either be less than zero, or greater 
or equal to zero. First, we deduce that if 0ijtGAP , the import price is below the maximum EP; 
and thus an increase of the import price above the entry price brings about the imposition of 
entry duties which erode the price competitiveness of the export goods. Thus, observations in 
which 0ijtGAP , export competition is eroded. Second, for observations with 0ijtGAP , then, the 
import price is equal or greater than the maximum EP, and no entry duty is levied.  
 
Cases of the import price being above the EP leads to a decrease in export price 
competitiveness, as the final price of the exports becomes more expensive relative to similar 
domestic goods, discouraging export purchases and thus inhibiting exports supply to the EU. 
However, cases in which the SIV is below the maximum EP means that EP duties would be 
incurred, thus making the final price of the exports to become more expensive. Adding in the 
EP duties to the synthetic import price (SIV) increases the final export price above the 
prevailing domestic price, thereby also discouraging exports. So, either way, the coefficient 
will be negative. This will hold unless the entry price duties is such that when added to the SIV, 
the final price of the exported good is so small that it falls below the prevailing domestic prices, 
such that export is still relatively cheaper than domestic goods. Or if the prevailing synthetic 
import price plus the duties is such that it is still lower than the domestic price for the good 
(such that the home market is a dumping ground for the product). If these last two scenarios are 
the case, then, the coefficient of this variable will be positive a priori. Given this, the coefficient 
of this indicator can be negative, positive or even insignificant and the exact impact is an 
empirical question.  
 
4.2.2. Stringency of Standards 
We constructed a simple pesticide standard restrictiveness index by combining information on 
the total number of pesticides regulated and level of stringency of the pesticides. On average, 
stringency of the standards is expected to increase as more pesticides are regulated, and the 
higher the level of pesticides standards, the lower its stringency level. The standard 
restrictiveness index is then: 
 
 
                    


n
k
ijkt
ijpt MRL
n
SRI
1
1
                                                                                          (4) 
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Here, n is the no of regulated pesticides in the importing country. The MRL of pesticides is 
measured in parts per million and expressed as mg/kg, and SRI is the pesticide standard 
restrictiveness index which measures the yearly average MRLs of all pesticide p imposed by 
importer j on i’s exports over time t. Lower MRL signifies higher stringency of the pesticide 
standards and vice versa, thus, the lower the index is, the higher the stringency of the pesticide 
standards.  The regulated pesticide restrictive index can then either have a direct or an inverse 
relationship with exports. A positive coefficient on it implies that standard is trade inhibiting as 
standards have a direct relationship with exports such that a decrease in the value of the 
standard restrictiveness index (increase in stringency) decreases exports. However, a negative 
value denotes that standard is trade promoting as standard has an inverse relationship with 
exports – such that a decrease in the stringency (increase in standard) increases exports. Given 
this, the coefficient on the index is expected to be positive if the pesticide standard limits trade. 
 
4.3. Data Sources 
Our dataset covers bilateral exports from selected African countries to the European Union 
countries who are major trading partners between 2008 and 20135. A list of countries included 
in the analysis is available in the appendix. Bilateral exports data was extracted from UN 
COMTRAD Via World Integrated Trade Solution (WITs) database at the Harmonised System 
digit 6 level. This covers 3 unique dataset on African exports of tomatoes (070200), oranges 
(080510) and, lime and lemon (080550) to the EU. Data on distance, language and colony were 
collected from the Centre d`Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) 
database; GDP data was from the World Bank World Development Indicator, while data used 
in constructing the regional agreement dummy was from the World Trade Organisation. Data 
on pesticide standards was manually collated online from the EUROPA database which houses 
a rich database of all pesticide standards developed and adopted by all EU Member States 
between 2008 and 2013. Data on EU entry price measures and duties in Euro was manually 
collated from EC TARIC website and was converted to US dollar using exchange rate data 
from the World Development Indicators dataset, 2014. The ad-valorem equivalents of the entry 
price duties were calculated using the WTO Agricultural method based on trade data from UN 
COMTRADE. Daily data on country specific standard import values on each product set by the 
European Commission are obtained from European Union designated daily publications.  
 
5.0 Results and Discussion  
The result of our probit equation estimated separately for the 3 unique datasets on tomato, lime 
and lemon, and orange are presented in this section. All models are estimated using random-
effects probit model with robust standard errors clustered across panels (exporter-importer-
year). The reported estimates are the marginal effects of the probit model.  
 
5.1. Impacts of EU Food Safety Standards on Africa’s Exports  
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of EU pesticide standards on African exports of 
the 3 selected products. The main results indicate that standards imposed by the EU on these 
products are barrier to Africa’s exports penetration. For all 3 products, regulated EU pesticide 
standards turn out to be positive and significant, implying that standards have a direct 
                                                          
5 The choice of our period of analysis hinges on two factors. First, access and availability of EU pesticide data starts from 2008. Second, this 
period is an important period in which pesticide standards were harmonised in EU (EC 396/2005) and the application of pesticides standards 
are more transparent. 
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relationship with exports such that a decrease in the standard (increase in the stringency of the 
pesticides standards) decreases the probability of exporting all 3 products to the EU. The 
average marginal effect on the probability of exporting is 6% for tomatoes, 7% for lime and 
lemon, and 4% for oranges and these are all on the prohibitive side. Our result confirms those 
of Wilson and Otsuki (2004), Chen et al. (2008) and Winchester et al. (2012), all authors find 
that pesticide standards can inhibit export penetration, and more recently by Xiong and Beghin 
(2014) and Ferro et al. (2015) who find pesticide standards hinder the likelihood of trade 
mainly through the extensive margin, particularly for developing countries.  
 
 
<Table 4 here> 
 
This result is as expected since as high as 70% of Africa’s fruits and vegetables products were 
rejected by the EU between 2008 and 2013 for exceeding EU pesticide residue limits (EC 
RAFFS, 2014). Furthermore, these products are part of the list of pesticide-contaminated fruits 
and vegetables that retain the high levels of pesticides residues and are more likely to test 
positive for multiple pesticides (EWG, 2013). Thus, this product attracts the most stringent 
standards to protect consumers, implying additional fixed costs to comply with them, which 
might be too much to bear for the small scale producers, most of which constitute exporters of 
this product in Africa.  In addition, the EU has been extending technical assistance to some 
farmers, producers and exporters in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries to enable 
them satisfy its safety standards and access EU markets. Two of such development cooperation 
are the Europe-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Liaison Committee and Pesticide Initiative P 
Programme (PIP) both of which have been supporting ACP fruits and vegetable sectors in order 
to maintain or increase the contribution of horticultural export on poverty reduction. However, 
potential exporters have not been able to benefit from such assistance and this could possibly 
explain their low potential to export to the EU and why standard constitutes a significant 
market access problem for them. The problem of complying with EU stringent pesticide 
standards is further aggravated for these African countries due to their lack of technical and 
financial capacity to satisfy EU standards and the lack of scientific knowledge to do so. This 
has led to significant trade diversion to other countries. For example, prior to the harmonisation 
of EU pesticide standards in 2008, African exported about 9% of its tomatoes to the EU. 
However with the new EU harmonisation law, the associated increase in the stringency of 
standards forced African’s exports to the EU to fall to 2.9 % with Africa redirecting its exports 
to the countries in the Middle East, particularly Jordan (Kareem, et al. 2015). 
 
On the supply side, the economic masses of African countries proxied by their GDPs do not 
significantly encourage the exportation of these products except for lime and lemon. This is in 
spite of the fact that Africa produces about 7 to 13 per cent of total world export of tomatoes 
and oranges in the last few years (FAOSTAT, 2014). Similar results were obtained by Mayer 
and Fajarnes (2008); Beghin and Xiong (2012) and Kareem et al. (2015) who confirmed that 
domestic market constraint such as countries’ sizes constitute a major constraint to Africa’s 
export penetration. Our results indicate that the exporting African countries income allocated to 
agriculture has not been significant in luring new exporters into this trade, thereby constitution 
an important constraint to initiating new trade relationships and might explain why some 
African exporters are gradually disappearing such that some export in some years and not in 
others (zero trade flows). An exception are lime and lemon exports where we see that Africa 
countries’ income or productive capacity has been able to enhance the probability of exporting 
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these products to the EU, such that a one percent increase in the income base of Africa has 
increased the probability of exporting to the EU by 0.25%. However, this productive capability 
is still low relative to the income growth the continent is experiencing in recent years.  
 
In contrast, on the demand side, the absorptive capacity of EU consumers measured by EU 
countries’ GDP is able to stimulate new trade, for all 3 products. However, the value is 
relatively low for tomatoes. One plausible reason for this is the unwillingness of EU consumers 
to consume conventional tomatoes and their increased preference for organic products. 
Nevertheless, this positive absorptive capacity of the importing countries in contrast with the 
weak productive capacity of the exporting countries indicates that a continuous promotion and 
expansion of this commodity is needed in order to meet the relative high import demand and 
harness immense benefits from trade.  
 
Regarding the other control variables, most of them are significant with the expected signs. 
Africa’s probability of exporting to the EU depends largely on whether the product was already 
exported in the initial period (initial_status). In other words, products already exported in year 
2008 (which is the start of the harmonisation of EU food regulations) have a high probability of 
being exported in subsequent years. In relation to other trade costs, distance hinders the exports 
of the three products to the EU. In particular, we find that the distant effect is largest for 
tomatoes exports representing about 3.9% decrease in probability of exporting as a result of a 
one percent increase in kilometre. This indicates the reluctancy to export tomatoes as a highly 
perishable product over such a long distance due to the transportations risk associated with it.  
Major reasons adduced for this large distance effect are the high cost incurred by the continent 
when conducting international transactions (Djankov et al., 2010), and Africa’s weak trade 
facilitation infrastructures which results into higher trade cost for the continent (Iwanow and 
Kirkpatric, 2009; Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2012). In addition, the probability of exporting 
these products turn out to depend largely on sharing common language and colonial ties with 
the EU. However, common language between the two trading partners has no apparent impact 
on the decision to export lime and lemon to the EU, while in the case of tomatoes, colonial tie 
between the country-pairs actually reduces the probability of trading.  
 
In addition, having a trade agreement relationship with the EU is a stimulating factor for 
potential African exporters in establishing possible new trade relationship, significantly 
impacting on Africa’s probability of exporting oranges to the EU. It has however no apparent 
effect on tomato as well as lime and lemon exports to the EU, which means that RTAs should 
be negotiated product by product and not at the aggregated level. However, one possible 
explanation for this is that regional trade agreements with the EU would not increase trade 
unless these exporting countries comply with EU pesticides standards which is applied on an 
MFN basis. Aside this, the benefits from all the  RTAs between Africa and the EU have been in 
form of preferential tariff to selected African countries while non-tariff measures are applied on 
an MFN6 basis with no preferential treatment even for countries in RTA relationships with the 
EU. This could thus explain why standard as a non-tariff measure constitute a significant 
market access problem for Africa. Aside this, other reasons adduced for this result are the lack 
of potential to harness the benefit for their use due the numerous Africa’s domestic market 
                                                          
6 Unlike tariff, most non-tariff measures such as food safety standards are regulated to achieve non-trade objectives and thus, could not be 
negotiated away the way tariff can. Thus, it is usually applied on an MFN basis. 
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constraints in terms of high level of corruption in the continent, inadequate education, their lack 
of sophisticated science and technology to improve their export products to the EU. Other 
factors are the hidden constraints or conditions in the RTAs such as rules of origin, EU 
minimum entry price control, all of which hinders Africa’s ability to penetrate the EU market. 
This implies that deeper agreements are needed to integrate African countries and to ensure 
their market access to the EU. 
 
 
5.2. Impacts of EU Entry Price Conditions on Africa’s Exports  
We now turn to investigate the effect of the second market access variable on the potential of 
generating export relationship with the EU. In relation to our market access variables, the 
estimates reported in Table 5 indicate that the EU entry price duty does not significantly affect 
the probability of exporting except for the case of tomatoes. In other words, the entry price 
system of the EU which penalize exporters whose standard import price is below a specified 
minimum entry price, is a significantly hurdle for tomato exporters to penetrate EU markets. 
More specifically, the coefficient on the ad-valorem entry price duties tomatoes exporters 
incurred from supplying their products below EU entry price is significant and negative, 
implying that entry price duties represent an important market access barrier for these potential 
tomatoes exporters. In essence, supplying tomatoes to the EU below the predetermined entry 
price by one percent brings about the imposition of duties which significantly decrease the 
probability to trade with the EU by as high as 14%. This is expected since entry price duties 
would be incurred as a penalty factor when the import price is below the maximum entry price, 
thus making cheaper exports more expensive and less competitive in EU markets. 
Consequently, the additional entry price duties increases the final import price above the 
prevailing domestic price in the EU, thereby discouraging exports and might force exporters to 
look for other markets and abandon the EU market, as EU entry price system inhibits trade 
much more than the regulated EU pesticide standards. 
 
<Table 5 here> 
 
On a related note, the second indicator of EU EPS (entry price GAP) which measures the 
competitiveness of Africa’s tomatoes import price of tomatoes supplied by Africa relative to 
domestic growers’ is also statistically significant and negative, showing that the imposition of 
the entry price erodes Africa’s price competitiveness. In fact, a one dollar increase in Africa’s 
price of importing tomatoes above the EU ceiling entry price reduces exports by 9.3% {that is 
089.0e -1*100}. The increase of the import price of tomatoes above the entry price brings about 
the imposition of additional duties which erodes the price competitiveness of tomato export. 
This leads to a decrease in export volume, as the final price of the exported good becomes more 
expensive relative to EU domestic prices, discouraging export purchases and creating market 
access problem for potential tomato exporters. Similar results were found by Chemnitz and 
Grethe (2005) on Morocco tomato exports to the EU and by Goetz and Grethe (2010) on 
China’s exports of apples and pears to the EU.  
 
However, in the case of lime and lemon as well as oranges, the trade impacts of the two 
variables capturing the EU entry price system are statistically indistinguishable from zero. This 
indicates that EU entry price system shows no apparent effects on these products and thus is not 
be relevant for these exporters in establishing new trade relationship with the EU or extending 
their products to new markets in the EU. More specifically, the first variable which is the EPS 
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duty is insignificant and thus irrelevant to export penetration Africa’s export market access to 
the EU. One plausible explanation for this might be that most of these exporters are already 
producing at a competitive price at home, as they have relative comparative advantage in the 
production of these commodities due to a tropical climate which favours their production all 
year round.  Thus, most of the countries produce at relatively lower costs compared to the EU 
growers such that no amount of extra duties incurred could discourage them from exporting to 
the EU. Consequently, the imposition of EU entry price duties on these products does not erode 
their price competitiveness; the import price is already highly competitive such that no 
stipulated amount of additional ad valorem tariff can erode such competitiveness. In fact, the 
entry price is of no relevance to them in their decision to export or not to export to the EU. 
 
Complementarily, the second variable (entry price GAP) is also not a significant market access 
problem for trade in lime and lemon as well as oranges. One possible explanation of this result 
is that plausibly, the exporters already have competitive cost advantage over EU growers and 
thus are supplying oranges at the lowest possible price while complying with the EP such that 
they are able to avoid paying the EP duties.  Thus, this result implies that for lime and lemon as 
well as oranges exports, EU entry price system is not relevant in the decision to enter new trade 
relationship with the EU, while EU stringent  pesticide standards is a more problematic factor 
in penetrating EU markets. Similar results was reported by Goetz and Grethe (2007) who found 
EU entry price control is of low importance for exports of oranges from selected Mediterranean 
countries to the EU. Our result also confirms those of Ciofﬁ and dell' Aquila (2004) regarding 
southern exporters to the EU.  
 
Turning to the control variables, the estimates in Table 5 show that importers’ GDP, and initial 
status are the major factors driving the African exporters’ possibility of establishing new trade 
relationships with the EU. In fact, the findings in Table 5 are closely similar to those obtained 
in Table 4, and therefore a similar interpretation applies. 
 
 
Robustness Checks 
We did a number of checks to assure the reliability of our results. Our first paramount concern 
is whether our results are driven by economically small export flows. We therefore excluded 
countries7 with value of less than a thousand USD bilateral exports to the EU to check if these 
outliers are the one driving the results obtained. The results of this check are presented in Table 
6. These results further highlight our previous conclusion since they are similar to those 
obtained in Tables 4 and 5, although the coefficients of the target variables are slightly lower in 
magnitude. Nevertheless, the basic message of this study in relation to the impact of the two 
non-tariff measures remains largely unchanged.  
 
<Table 6 here> 
 
                                                          
7 The excluded countries are in the tomato dataset , Chad, Libya, Mauritius, Sam Tome and Zambia; Drop Mozambique, Niger, Cameroon, 
Togo, Guinea Bissau for the lime and lemon dataset and Chad, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, Gambia are excluded in the orange 
dataset.  
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A second concern is whether the results are driven by the characteristics8 of the exporting 
countries such as ‘outlier countries’ with huge GDP.  To address this concern, we have 
excluded Nigeria and South Africa from our datasets as they are the two most important 
countries with huge economic growth in Africa. The results presented in Table 7 are similar to 
those obtained in Tables 4 and 5 and so, our major conclusion remain the same, meaning that 
our results are robust to the exclusion of the two largest African countries. 
 
<Table 7 here> 
 
Lastly, there are concerns that standards could be endogenous and might have appeared 
following an import surge (Essaji, 2008; Ferro et al., 2015). Under pressure from lobby groups, 
the EU might have enacted regulations on MRLs of pesticides to deliberately limit import flow 
in a particular sector. Following these presumption, some studies have used the lagged values 
of standards as instruments. However, based on anecdotal evidence, we argue that EU standard 
is rather exogenous in nature, at least for MRL of pesticides. This is because it takes at least 
about 10 years to get a first approval for pesticides in the EU (Article 5, EC 1107/2009) and a 
minimum of 3 years to get a second stage approval for already approved pesticides.  In 
addition, all approved pesticide substances that have been on the EU market for 10 years or 
more are periodically reviewed after 10 years. This scenario thus depicts that EU pesticides 
standards might not have appeared following an import rise and thus, it is not necessarily 
endogenous. However, as a robust check we used lagged values of pesticides standards as 
instrument. Since our analysis covers 6 years, we used the first lag of standards as instruments 
to avoid losing a lot of observations and degree of freedom. We presume lagged values to be 
appropriate instruments due to two reasons: current standards are highly correlated with 
previous ones, and current export flows cannot influence previously enacted standards. 
Columns 2 through 4 of Table 8 report the results which are consistent with our previous 
findings.  EU standards reduce the probability of exporting as standards deters potential 
exporters from accessing EU markets due to the costs needed to upgrade their supply and 
production chains in order to comply with EU standards.  
<Table 8 here> 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This study investigates the impact of two non-tariff aspects of EU food regulation on tomatoes, 
oranges, and lime and lemons exports to the EU. Our results have several implications for 
stimulating exports and encouraging potential exporters in Africa. Our main results show that 
EU standard inhibits exporters’ probability to export to the EU for all 3 products.  In addition, 
we found the EU entry price control to have no apparent effect on potential exporters of 
oranges and lime and lemons, but exert significant negative influence on the probability of 
exporting tomatoes to the EU. Our results also indicate government’s neglect of promoting and 
                                                          
8 To address this concern, Nigeria and South Africa are excluded from our exporting countries sample as they are the two most important 
countries in terms of having huge economic growth. 
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expanding the production of these export products, given the low magnitude and or 
insignificant sign of the exporters’ GDP obtained in most cases. This points out that apart from 
market access problem, the root of Africa’s marginalization in world trade is multiple, 
indicating that fostering the continent’s integration with the global economy will require 
policies targeted at removing both domestic supply constraints and ensuring external demand 
for the continent’s exports.   
 
This study find standards can and indeed act as an impediment to initiating export relationship 
with the EU. However, according to Jaffee and Henson (2004), this is not always the case as 
increased and tightening of standards can also serve as catalysts for poor countries to 
participate in international trade if such countries adhere to the standards set by importing 
countries. Numerous technical and financial assistances are being extended by the EU and 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to selected African exporters to 
assist them in complying with stringent standards and also prepare them for export markets. 
This has made exporting countries to upgrade their supply capacities to fit importing countries 
standards, to reposition themselves in competitive international markets and enhance market 
access (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). Thus, such assistance should also be extended to potential 
exporters and should be targeted to ensure compliance with EU standards and prepare them for 
exporting to the EU so as to reap maximum economic benefit.  
 
More importantly, trade negotiations with the EU should include the provision of sophisticated 
technological and scientific assistance to Africa’s agricultural sector, particularly to small-scale 
producers dominating the scene, so as to assist them in complying with EU standards and 
enhance continuous market access for the continent. In addition, agreements with the EU 
negotiated to ensure the provision of preferential entry price control for African countries to 
enable them maintain their competitiveness in EU markets are important policy imprints for the 
African policy makers. At the country level, policy should be channeled towards the removal of 
domestic market constraints which will increase production for export. This could be achieved 
through a whole hearted commitment to the implementation of strong regulatory framework 
and the development of strong institutions that would boost country-level capacity to satisfy 
food safety requirements. All these blueprints needed to be faithfully implemented for trade to 
serve as a promising avenue to boost economic growth for the continent.  
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Table 1: Schedule of EU Entry Price Control for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables and the 
Applicable Duties 
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 Tomatoes Oranges Lemons9 
Application Date 01.01–31.12 01.12–31.05 01.01–31.12 
Mininum EP (€/100kg) 52.60 32.60 46.20 
Maximum EP (€/100kg) 112.60 35.4 55.8 
Specific EPDuties (€/100kg) 0-29.80 0-7.10 0-25.60 
Highers EP duty (€/100kg) 29.80 7.10 25.60 
Source: European Commission, TARIC Database, 2014 
 
 
Table 2: Detailed EPS Schedule for Tomato: 01.04 to 30.04 
Cases EP Conditions for Different Import 
Prices (MP) in Comparison with Entry 
Prices 
 Entry Price  Duties 
1 MP ≥ 112.60 EUR/100 kg  - 
2 MP ≥ 110.30 EUR/100 kg  2.30 EUR /100 kg 
3 MP ≥ 108.10 EUR/100 kg  4.50 EUR /100 kg 
4 MP ≥ 105.80EUR/100 kg  6.80 EUR /100 kg 
5 MP ≥ 103.60 EUR/100 kg  9.00 EUR /100 kg 
6 MP ≥ 0 EUR/100 kg  29.80 EUR /100 kg 
Source: EC TARIC, 2014 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Export Performance and Direction of Trade of Africa’s Exports, 1995 to 2013 
                       Tomatoes Oranges Lime & Lemon 
Main 
Importer 
1995
-
2013 
1995
-
2007 
2008
-
2013 
Main 
Importer 
1995
-
2013 
1995
-
2007 
2008
-
2013 
Main 
Importer 
1995
-
2013 
1995
-
2007 
2008
-
2013 
Africa 86.5 74.4 91.6 Africa 80.1 80.6 79.8 Africa 67.1 68.1 66.7 
EU 7.7 9.4 2.9 EU 16.8 13.0 18.9 EU 24.8 18.9 27.4 
Jordan 2.9 0.04 4.1 Israel 0.8 1.6 0.4 Argentina 4.1 8.6 2.2 
Syria 1.3 3.8 0.2 Australia 0.6 1.6 0.01 Israel 0.8 0.6 0.9 
Others 1.6 12.4 1.2 Others 1.7 3.2 0.89 Others 3.2 3.8 2.8 
Total 100.
0 
100.
0 
100.
0 
Total 100.
0 
100.
0 
100.
0 
Total 100.
0 
100.
0 
100.
0 
Source: Calculation based on Data from UN COMTRADE 
 
 
                                                          
9 EU entry price control only covers lemon but does not extend to lime. 
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Table 4: Effects of EU Standards on Africa’s Exports 
VARIABLES Tomatoes Lime and Lemon Oranges 
Exporters GDP 0.095 0.249** 0.080 
 (0.095) (0.109) (0.090) 
Importers GDP 0.260* 0.629*** 0.572*** 
 (0.134) (0.234) (0.128) 
EU Pesticide Standards 6.004*** 6.885*** 4.012*** 
 (1.509) (1.541) (1.224) 
Initial Status 1.097*** 0.546** 0.554*** 
 (0.252) (0.255) (0.193) 
Distance -3.898** -2.896* -2.851*** 
 (1.607) (1.554) (0.893) 
Colony 0.170 2.876** 1.637** 
 (0.239) (1.153) (0.823) 
Language 2.197*** 1.028 2.867*** 
 (0.698) (0.841) (0.684) 
RTA 0.253 0.593 1.138** 
 (0.568) (1.218) (0.495) 
Constant -12.23*** -26.34*** -19.29*** 
 (3.805) (6.520) (4.235) 
Observations 1,176 1,248 1,050 
Note: Reported coefficients are average marginal effects of probit model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by 
importer, exporter and year; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Effects of Entry Price Control on Africa’s Exports 
VARIABLES Tomatoes Lime and Lemon Oranges 
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Exporters GDP 0.144 0.314*** 0.117 
 (0.0980) (0.110) (0.0905) 
Importers GDP 0.242* 0.527*** 0.538*** 
 (0.130) (0.197) (0.118) 
Entry Price Duty -14.16*** -28.28 0.577 
 (5.113) (18.25) (0.430) 
Entry Price Gap -0.0888*** -0.00190 0.0169 
 (0.0309) (0.00238) (0.0119) 
Initial Status 1.026*** 0.480* 0.537*** 
 (0.241) (0.250) (0.183) 
Distance -3.699** -2.731* -2.739*** 
 (1.536) (1.414) (0.866) 
Colony -0.596** 2.616** 1.648** 
 (0.242) (1.052) (0.823) 
Language 2.119*** 0.986 2.759*** 
 (0.691) (0.757) (0.655) 
RTA 1.063 1.316 2.201** 
 (0.653) (1.259) (0.864) 
Constant -12.74*** -24.74*** -19.16*** 
 (3.768) (5.663) (4.104) 
Observations 1,176 1,248 1,050 
Note: Reported coefficients are average marginal effects of probit model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by 
importer, exporter and year; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Robustness Checks with an Alternative Sample: Eliminating Economically Small 
Export Flows 
 Entry Price System  Food Safety Standards 
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Note: Reported coefficients are average marginal effects of probit model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by 
importer, exporter and year; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 7: Robustness Checks: Robust Checks: Sensitivity to Outliers 
 Entry Price System  Food Safety Standards 
VARIABLES Tomatoes Lime & 
Lemon 
Oranges  Tomatoes Lime & 
Lemon 
Oranges 
Exporters GDP 0.0759 0.313** 0.132  0.0138 0.241* 0.0918 
 (0.0971) (0.128) (0.100)  (0.0983) (0.127) (0.101) 
Importers GDP 0.307** 0.707*** 0.549***  0.327** 0.837*** 0.584*** 
 (0.134) (0.230) (0.121)  (0.140) (0.272) (0.132) 
Entry Price Duty -14.45*** -29.63 0.353     
 (5.472) (18.52) (0.466)     
Entry Price Gap -0.089*** -0.002 0.011     
 (0.033) (0.002) (0.0124)     
VARIABLES Tomatoes Lime & 
Lemon 
Oranges  Tomatoes Lime & 
Lemon 
Oranges 
Exporters GDP 0.124 0.278** 0.0760  0.0639 0.185* 0.0172 
 (0.110) (0.136) (0.119)  (0.107) (0.112) (0.121) 
Importers GDP 0.284** 0.695*** 0.510***  0.308** 0.753*** 0.546*** 
 (0.141) (0.255) (0.129)  (0.148) (0.269) (0.143) 
Entry Price Duty -11.79** -36.15 0.244     
 (5.110) (23.27) (0.481)     
Entry Price Gap -0.074** -0.0004 0.012     
 (0.031) (0.004) (0.013)     
EU Pesticide 
Standards 
    6.033*** 6.322*** 4.099*** 
     (1.646) (1.718) (1.391) 
Initial Status 0.888*** 0.518* 0.475**  0.991*** 0.582* 0.486** 
 (0.259) (0.313) (0.209)  (0.272) (0.307) (0.222) 
Distance -3.633** -4.615 -2.432***  -3.830** -4.178* -2.580*** 
 (1.590) (2.884) (0.848)  (1.665) (2.172) (0.882) 
Colony -0.530** 3.138* 1.659**  0.167 2.985* 1.651* 
 (0.252) (1.807) (0.836)  (0.258) (1.563) (0.846) 
Language 2.073*** 1.610 2.335***  2.166*** 1.481 2.440*** 
 (0.761) (1.018) (0.692)  (0.777) (1.032) (0.731) 
RTA 1.274* 8.811 1.929***  0.312 5.152** 1.102** 
 (0.663) (7.347) (0.726)  (0.537) (2.011) (0.484) 
Constant -13.25*** -29.16*** -17.19***  -12.63*** -28.51*** -16.86*** 
 (4.122) (8.096) (4.563)  (4.175) (7.599) (4.744) 
Observations 966 1,008 756  966 1,008 756 
25 
 
EU Pesticide 
Standards 
    5.742*** 6.551*** 3.727*** 
     (1.571) (1.572) (1.294) 
Initial Status 1.037*** 0.460* 0.500***  1.096*** 0.502* 0.507** 
 (0.252) (0.259) (0.189)  (0.264) (0.263) (0.199) 
Distance -3.607** -2.406* -2.777***  -3.827** -2.638* -2.912*** 
 (1.547) (1.425) (0.880)  (1.657) (1.549) (0.908) 
Colony -0.585** 2.287** 2.059**  0.137 2.471** 2.072** 
 (0.255) (1.083) (0.851)  (0.249) (1.173) (0.855) 
Language 2.221*** 1.216 2.526***  2.308*** 1.344 2.613*** 
 (0.703) (0.803) (0.661)  (0.718) (0.873) (0.691) 
RTA 0.909 1.294 2.123**  0.292 0.650 1.244** 
 (0.601) (1.317) (0.838)  (0.570) (1.249) (0.530) 
Constant -12.86*** -29.54*** -19.78***  -12.13*** -31.73*** -19.86*** 
 (3.874) (6.820) (4.187)  (3.997) (7.792) (4.324) 
Observations 1,092 1,152 966  1,092 1,152 966 
Note: Reported coefficients are average marginal effects of probit model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by 
importer, exporter and year; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 8: Robustness Check: Endogeneity of Pesticide Standards 
Variables Tomatoes Lime and Lemons Oranges 
Exporters GDP 0.0999 0.316*** 0.0829 
 (0.0972) (0.118) (0.0979) 
Importers GDP 0.242* 0.607*** 0.551*** 
 (0.137) (0.225) (0.131) 
EU Pesticide Standards 1t  4.697*** 4.530*** 2.240* 
 (1.341) (1.602) (1.314) 
Initial Status 0.320 -0.470 -0.0241 
 (0.253) (0.374) (0.237) 
Distance -4.270** -3.411* -2.911*** 
 (1.663) (2.041) (0.876) 
Colony -0.147 2.842** 1.976** 
 (0.246) (1.159) (0.844) 
Language 2.212*** 1.075 2.557*** 
 (0.690) (0.841) (0.683) 
RTA -4.670 1.539 4.330 
 (3.844) (1.533) (5.996) 
Constant -11.50*** -27.04*** -18.58*** 
 (3.792) (6.519) (4.249) 
Observations 980 1,040 805 
Note: Reported coefficients are average marginal effects of probit model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by 
importer, exporter and year; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Appendix 
Table A1: List of Countries in the Tomato Dataset 
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Country Groups Members 
Importers (EU) Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
Exporters  (Africa) Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo,  
Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt Arab Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo.  
 
Table A2: List of Countries in the Lime and Lemon Dataset 
Country Groups Members 
Importers (EU) France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain 
Exporters  (Africa) Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa 
 
Table A3: List of Countries in the Oranges Dataset 
Country Groups Members 
Importers (EU) Belgium, France, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
Exporters  (Africa) Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo,  
Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt Arab Republic, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Togo.  
 
